Sunglasses Styles

follows: When one approaches a point upon a highway where a railroad track is crossed upon the same level, it is his plain duty to proceed with caution, and if he attempts to cross the track, either on foot or in vehicle of any description, be must exercise In so doing what the law regards as ordinary care underthe circumstances. He must assume that there Is danger, and act with ordinary prudence aria, circumspection upon that assumption. The requirenrents of the law, moreover, proceed beyond the featureless generality that one must do his duty In this respect, or must exercise ordinary care under the elrcuinstau,ces. The law defines precisely what tn term ‘ordinary care under the circumstances shall mean in these cases. In the progres of the law In this behalf the question of car at railway crossings, as affecting the trave er, is no longer, as a rule, a question for tta Jury. The quantum of care is exactly pn scribed as matter of law. In atternptcix to cross the traveler must listen for signal notice signs put up as warnings, and look a tentively up and down the track.If a traveler, by looking, could have seen approaching train In time to escape, tfc -vr, be presumed, in case he is injured oylisiou, either that he did not look, or, he did look, that he did not heed what saw. Such conduct is held negligence?se. The same thought in different Iang\ is also expressed In the following wall- sidered cases: Herbert v. S. P. Ry. CoCalPac Durbin v. Or. H.y ,OrPacAm. St. Rep. -j; Pyle T.Clark C. C.Fed The cases which have declared and enforced the rale that where a person In approaching a railroad crossing has failed to look when he could have seen, or has failed to listen when he conld have heard, or, in case he could neither see nor hear, has failed to exercise ordinary care to guard against accident before entering upon the track, is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and cannot recover, are very numerous. Among the great number of cases that mipht be dted we refer to the following well-eonsldered cases: Gothard v. Ala. & G. G. RyAla Pepper v. S. P. Ry. CoCalPac Herbert v. S. P. Ry CoCalPac Railroad Co. T.Crisman,ColoPac Peck v. N. T N. H. & H. RyConn Mann T.Belt Ry eta, CoIndN. E Nixon v. C, R. I. & P. RyIowa N. W U. P. Ry. Co. v. Adams, KanPac Allen v. Maine Cent. EyMe. Ill,Atl Shufelt v. Railroad CoMichN. W Harris v. M. & St L. RyMinn S N. W Kelsay v. Mo. P. RyMo. W Pa. Ry. Co. v. Righter,N. J. Law Wilcox v. Rome & O. G. RyX. TAm. Dec Cooper v. North Carolina Ry. CoN. CS. EL. R. A. N. S Ourbln v. Oregon Ry. CoOrPacAm. St Rep Holden v. Pa. Ry. CoPa. I Atl Beyel v. N. N. & M. V. Ry W. VaS. E Seefeld v. C, M.St P. RyWisN. WAm. St Rep Horn v. B. & O. RyFed. SOLC. C. A Pyle v. Clark C. C.Ted We have refrained from citing more tban one case from each state except from California, and we cited the second case from that state because the matter as to when such a question Is one of fact or merely f law Is more fully discussed In the second ease cited.The principle Involved in the foregoing cases is referred to and adopted in the case atSilcoc v. R. G. W. RyUtahPac although the accident in that case did not arise out of a collision at a crossing. In the case of Teakle v. S. P L. A. & S. L. JtvUtah PacL. R. A. Of-and In Rogers v. R. G. W. Ryrtah Pac we announced the doctrine that although the employes of a railroad company are guilty of negligence, tiiis does not absolve the Injured person from exercising that degree of care which the law requires of him for his own safety, arid If by the exercise of ordinary care on his pert the Injury could have been avoided, arid If this fact is conceded, or Is clearly established by the undisputed evidence in the case, then he is guilty of such negligence as wfll prevent a recovery unless the Injury eoold have been avoided by the railroad comthe injured person is discovered in a place of Imminent danger. Where the latter phase of an accident Is Involved, it is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury, and this is so, although the

As the contributory delinquent lawprescribes a punishment for persons who contribute to the delinquency of a delinquent child or a Juvenile delinquent person, as defined by the juvenile law, we must look to the last-mentioned law to learn who are delinquent children. Sectionof the delinquent children law says that the act shall apply only to children sixteenyearn, of age or under.The words ‘delinquent child’ shall Include any child sixteenyears of age or under such age who violates any law, etc. Any child sixteenyears of age or under such age may, therefore, become a delinquent child or a Juvenile delinquent person. The Attorney General contends that these Italicized words Include children during their entire sixteenth year and up tothe seventeenth anniversary of their birth, while defendant maintains that it excludes children who have passed beyond the first day of their sixteenth year. The controverted point as to whether a person arrives at a certain age on the last minute of the day next preceding the given anniversary of his birth, or on the first minute of such anniversary, or at some other given moment, Is not Involved here, and we are not to be understood as deciding it We make this observation, for defendant’s counsel concedes that during the whole of the sixteenth anniversary day of his birth defendant would be subject to the law. Counsel have not found in any other statute or Constitution or In any Judicial decision wherein It has been construed the exact language employed In the statute now under consideration, and we have not made the discovery. Many quotations from our statutory law whereby our General Assembly has fixed the age limit are printed in the briefs, but outside of the statute now before us the exact definitive or restrictivewords are not employed. It is obvious tliat the General Assembly intended to fix: some limit to the age of children affected by the statutea point of time beyond whlcb they no longer are amenable to its provisions. In one sense a child isyears of age until II Is ; so also It iswhen it is ; but. In the true sense, It isand over wheneverhas passed beyond the first day of the six teenth anniversary of its birth. Had It beei the Intention to include children up to th time they reach their seventeenth birthday the General Assembly would naturally hav said children under seventeen years of age. But, when only those sixteenyears o age or under were mentioned, It obvlousl meant what it said, namely, children sla teenyears of age or under, not sixtee years of age and over. If a statute pri scribing the age limit read, over the agefourteen years, oneyears andmontl old would not come within its provisionsbecause he would be onlyyears of age, and not over , until he reached the fifteenth anniversary of his birth. And yet we apprehend no such construction would be put upon a statute so reading. A child Isyears of age on the sixteenth anniversary of his birth, and thereafter is overyears of age. The alleged delinquent juvenile, beingyears andmonths old at the time defendant is said to have contributed to his delinquency, was sixteen years and over, not sixteen years or under; hence was not a Juvenile delinquent person within the meaning of the statute.. The contributory delinquent law declares that the parent or parents, legal guardian, or person having the custody of such child, or any other person, who contributes to the delinquency of a delinquent juvenile person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Defendant was not a parent or guardian, or the costodlan of the Juvenile delinquent, but the Attorney General says she comes within the expression or any other person. The familiar general rule, which is enforced in this jurisdiction. Is that, where words of general import follow specific designations, the application of the general language is controlled by the specific. This Is but a rule of construction, and Is not allowed to defeat the plain legislative will; yet, where the legislative Intent is doubtful, resort to rules of construction Is proper. Applying this rule to this

Name of Stahl, notwithstanding he is uo longer in office; for the statute provides that, in case of any other transfer of Interest than by death or other disability, the action may be continued In the name of the original party. Gen. St; Hegewlsch v. Silver,N. YN. E The Judgment is affirmed.LAKE et aL v. STAHL. Supreme Court of Kansas. Dec.Rehearing Denied Jan Error from District Court, Shawnee County; A. W. Dana, Judge.Seven separate actions between Frank M. Stahl and W. F. Lake and others. From the judgments, Lake and others bring error. Affirmed.Hungate & Mngaw, for plaintiffs in error. W. H. Cowles, for defendant in error.PER CtJRIAM. These cases involve the same questions as Charles M. Mines v. Frank M. Stahl NoPac and are affirmed for the same reasons.STORM v. TERRITORY. Supreme Court of Arizona. Jan. . CriminalLaw FobmebJeopardyburdenOfProof.On a plea of former jeopardy, the presumptions are against defendant, and he has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that his plea is well founded in fact.Id. Note.For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. f ; Dec. Dig… JuryJ CriminalProsecutionIsSueOfFormerJeopardy.Defendant in a criminal prosecution is not entitled to a trial by jury of the issue on a plea of former jeopardy.Ed. Note.For other cases, see Jury, Dec. Dig..On motion for rehearing. Motion denied. For former opinion, seePacNAVE, J. The urgency with which appellant contends that the effect of our decisionPac.is to deprive him of a constitutional right Impels us, In denying his motion for rehearing, to add to the statement of our view as to the question of the necessity of a verdict upon the issue of former jeopardy. It must not be overlooked that the issue raised by a plea of former jeopardy is different in Its nature from that raised by a plea of not guilty. The former does not go to the merits of the charge against the defendant It is tried upon a different theory and by different procedure. Upon the plea of not guilty, the presumption is that the defendant is innocent. Upon the issue of former jeopardy, the presumption is against the defendant Upon the Issue of not guilty, every reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the defendant and the burden is upon the prosecution to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant. Upon the issue of former jeopardy, the burden Is upon the defendant to satisfy the Jury by a preponderance of the evidence that his plea of former jeopardy is well founded in fact. The doubts are resolved against him.Cyc The analogy between the proceedings on this Issue and the proceedings in civil cases Is manifest. At common law the defendant must set forth the record upon which he predicates his claim of former jeopardy. Upon demurrer thereto the court may disallow the plea. We have so changed the procedure that the basis of the plea is not disclosed until evidence upon it is offered; but that change does not In itself afford a reason for denying to the trial court the authority to disallow the plea as a matter of law upon the record offered to support it. In our former opinion we showed that, among other courts, the Supreme Court of California, from which state we adopted our Penal Code, holds with us that, where there Is no dispute of fact to be resolved under such a plea, it is the duty of the court to direct a verdict The analogy with the procedure In civil cases is thus made quite complete. It is true there are decisions to the contrary. We have not failed to examine them.The Constitution compels the submission to the jury of the Issue upon the merits, even though the evidence incontestably demonstrates the defendant’s guilt. The Jury, can repudiate all the evidence with or without reason, and find the defendant not guilty. The Constitution does not compel submission to the uncontrolled judgment of the Jury of an issue made by the plea of former jeopardy, unsupported by facts. No constitutional privilege of the

quite in public. Some date orchards and gardens were scattered about. The people looked like GooranArabs, if I may be allowed the expression.July 25th.A true burning saum, or hot wind, See Residence in Koordistan, vol. 1. p. 80.f The intense heat of the wind at Tchahkoota is remarkable, as showing how small a space of hot country is sufficient to dry and heat the wind. The wind was W., consequently came directly from the sea, from which we could not be further distant than eight or ten miles yet it had acquired every quality of a true saum. The thermometer was 110° in the coolest place we could find, yet I found this less oppressive than the moist heat of Bushire.which seemed quite to invigorate my Bagdadees.Tchahkoota, which means shallow well, can turn out upon necessity ahout 800 musketeers. The people are Sunnis, of the Maleki and Shafei sects.We left Tchahkoota at half-past eight in the evening, and proceeded in a northerly direction, over broken ground, which was sometimes rocky, and sometimes deep sand, and over which were sprinkled many large bushes, affording, we were told, shelter to hares and antelopes. The night was extremely hot, and the ground seemed to send up quite a reflection of heat.We stopped about fifty minutes for refreshments, and at two o’clock in the morning we arrived at Burauzgoon, passing first along gardens and plantations of date-trees, tobacco, &c.,for about two miles. We went to the new caravanserai, which is not yet finished, but affords tolerable accommodation under the gateway. I was much flagged and exhausted by the heat of the weather, and I had besides the luxury of a stumbling mule. I dislike nightmarches very much; they completely reverse all one’s habits.July 26th.Selim Aga, the governor of Burauzgoon, sent us a present of a very fine mountain goat, the chordof whose horns measured about two feet the colour was like that of the antelope, but the flesh tasted more like beef than antelope. We were attended here by a Gebr, or fire-worshipper, whose brother has turned Armenian, and resides at Bushire. The Armenians seem to have hopes of the conversion of this brother also.The proper name of Burauzgoon is Barazjan. It is a very considerable place, though built chiefly of mud, with a bazar resembling that of Sulimania. There are 32 families of Jews here. The people of the place are all Shiyyahs, and speak a dialect even more difficult to understand than that of Bushire. In the afternoon I sauntered out a little to look at the country. Burauzgoon is about three miles from the hills, which look very bare. The neighbourhood of the town is very naked and stony, sprinkled over with bushes, among which was a very large kind of milk-wort: hares and antelopes likewise abound. The hills before us are celebrated for a profusion of medicinal herbs, as well as partridges and wild goats.The governor insisted on sending a man with us to take a few riflemen at a post on the road, as the vicinity of Daulekee happens to be unsafe at this moment. We marched at half-past seven in the evening, and approached the hills very gradually over a more stony road, indented and worn with torrents, than we had hitherto met with. At about half way we came to a Rahdari, or guard-house, round which was a considerable village, and here we took out our guard, who had only matchlocks.As we approached the hills our noses informed us we were in the vicinity of sulphur and naphtha. Our guard here took leave of us, cracking off their matchlocks, and shortly after we passed the little stream near the hills, into which several sources of naphtha discharge themselves. The sulphureous and bituminous smell was intolerable. We then roundeda promontory in the hills, and after having passed over the naphtha water, we arrived at Daulekee at one o’clock. We had halted half an hour at the guardhouse, so that our whole inarch was about four hours and a half. We put up at the caravanserai, which was a very tolerable building, but so singularly situated

Frovision reducing the number of grand
Vurors required to Investigate criminal charges was ex post facto in respect to offenses committed before the Constitution was adopted, and whether a prosecution by information could be sustained for a felony committed before the Constitution was adopted.The same Chief Justice Blake rendered the opinion of the court in the case of State v. Klngsly,MontPac a well-considered case, the reporter’s syllabus of which is: Constitutional LawProsecution by Information. A conviction in a court of the state for a felony committed in the territory prior to the adoption of the Constitution cannot be sustained where the prosecution was by information, as provided by the Constitution and the act of March relating thereto, as the provision of the federal Constitution guaranteeing to the accused the right to be prosecuted through the Intervention of a grand Jury was, at the time of the commission of the offense, the supreme law of the land, and the substitution by the state Constitution of prosecution by information in place of that by indictment, not being a matter affecting the procedure, deprived the accused of a substantial right, and gave said act a retrospective operationciting State v. Ah Jim,Mont G,Pac As the information in the Ah Jim Case sought to charge an offense committed before statehood, in the territory of Montana, it will be seen that the point relied upon by counsel was not the decisive question In that case, and it occurs to us that the learned Chief Justice who rendered the opinion failed to give any sufficient or satisfactory reasons for holding that the clause of the Montana Constitution respecting prosecutions by information for offenses committed after statehood does not execute itself. He simply gives a literal construction to article , Schedule,, as quoted. Judging from the court’s opinion in the Ah Jim Case, and the provisions of the Constitution of Montana, as quoted, the case is clearly distinguished from the case at bar.The Constitution of Oklahoma provides as follows:Art. No person shall be prosecuted criminally in courts of record for felony or misdemeanor or otherwise than by presentment or Indictment or by information. No person shall be prosecuted for a felony by information without having had a preliminary examination before an examining magistrate, or having waived such preliminary examination. Prosecutions may be instituted in courts not of record upon a duly verified complaint. Bunn’s Ed..IdA grand Jury shall be composed of twelve men, any nine of whom concurring may find an Indictment or true bill.der of a judge of a court having the power to try and determine felonies, upon his own motion; or such grand jury shall be ordered by such judge upon the filing of petition therefor, signed by one hundred resident taxpayers of the county; when so assembled such grand jury shall have power to Investigate and return Indictments for all character, and grades of crime, and such other powers as the Legislature may prescribe. Provided, that the Legislature may make the calling of a grand jury compulsory. Bunn’s Ed..IdIn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial by an Impartial jury of the county in which the crime shall have been committed. Provided that the venue may be changed to some other county of the state on the application of the accused, In such manner as may be prescribed by law. He shall be Informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and have a copy thereof, and be confronted with the witnesses against him, and have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his behalf. He shall have the right to be heard by himself and counsel, and in capital cases, at least two days before the case is called for trial, he shall be furnished with a list of’ the witnesses that will be called In chief, to prove the allegations of the indictment, or information, together with their post-office addresses. Bunn’s Ed..Id. f . The

And also decreed a lien In their favor upon the bark remaining in their possession, and directed Its enforcement by sale. The only point on this appeal on the merits Is as to whether the respondents were entitled to any Hen against the tanbark in question and which it Is conceded was the property of the appellants Hill.Respondents base their claim to a Hen upon sectionof the Civil Code, which provides that a person who makes, alters or repairs any article of personal property, at the request of the owner, or legal possessor of the property, has a Hen upon the same for his reasonable charges for the work done and materials furnished, and may retain the possession of the same until the charges are paid. If not paid within two months after the work is done the person may proceed to sell the property at public auction upon giving ten days’ public notice of the sale, etc. As far as the first part of the section which we have quoted is concerned, it simply declares the common-law rule as to the right of a mechanic or artisan performing labor on an article of personal property to a lien thereon dependent on possession for payment for his service. While at common law the right to a Hen extended to a large class of persons, It was the intention of the Legislature by the Code provision to extend Its application so that any person who had altered or repaired any article of personal property at the request of the owner or legal possessor thereof should have the benefit of a lien. It was intended also by the Code provision to provide for a method of enforcing the Hen which did not exist at common law because at common law no lien on a chattel for work done or materials furnished gave a right to a sale of the chattel for the enforcement of the lien. Boisot on Mechanics’ Liens, $ . But while the Code has extended the right to a lien in general to all persons performing the presonal property at the request of the owner or legal possessor thereof, it Is In other respects but declaratory of the common-law rule, and the right to a Hen must be governed by the same rules which prevailed at common law. It can only be asserted under the same circumstances and conditions as it could be asserted at common law, and the right to do so must be interpreted in accordance with common-law principles.Now as to the common-law rule: It will be observed that there was no contract between the Hills and the respondents for the peeling of the bark against which the latter assert their lien. They were not the employes of the Hills. The Hills had made their contract directly with Sandman for the work, and Sandman had employed the respondents to do the labor for him. They were the employes of Sandman and could only look to him for payment of their wages upon his personal contract therefor. Under these circumstances, the respondents would have no lien upon the property of the Hills at common law, and, as the Code section is but declaratory of that law, could have no lien under it. At common law the right to a lien existed only in favor of the person who had done the work directly under a contract with the owner of the article of personal property upon which it had been expended, or where it had been done by agreement with some one authorized by the owner to contract with the person to do the work. Privity of contract between the owner of the chattel and the mechanic was an essential prerequisite to support the claim of lien. It did not lie in favor of an employe or servant of the person who had contracted with the owner to do It. The only security which the employe performing service on a chattel had was the personal responsibility of his employer on the contract of hiring. In speaking of the right to such a Hen at common law, it is tersely said In Jones on Liens because the principle is not open to question that the lien belongs strictly to the person who has contracted with the owner to do the work. A servant or Journeyman or subcontractor of such person has no Hen. Jones on Liens, vol p The rule is stated to the same

Rknowing the samo’to be false, or shall ycar? anil perin like manner deny any fact, knowing the same to be true, or shall refuse to Pclua| disabilidepose, affirm or declare such fact, knowing the same to be true, the person ty asJuroriwltBooffending, shall be deemed guilty of perjury, and upon conviction thereof, “i’0JInj>p,Cer shall be fined in a sum not exceeding one thousand dollars, and imprisoned not ‘ ary”exceeding twelve months, and be perpetually disabled from giving testimbnyin any court within this state, being a juror, or sustaining any office, civil or .military, in this state: Provided,Th-.it nothing in this section contained,shall Proviso,be so construed, as to compel any person to criminate liitn or herself.} 11. That if any person, legally called upon to give testimony before any Refusal to take court, or other authority in this state, authorized to administer oaths and af- oath or nflirmafirmations, shall refuse to take an oath or affirmation, such court or authority tion; imprisonshall commit the person, so refusing, to prison, till he or she shall consent to mcutandfinc. take such oath or affirmation; ami after the person committed to prison as aforesaid, shall have taken the oath or affirmation required, the court or authority aforesaid, may moreover punish such person, for such refusal, by a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding six months.}. 12. That if any person shall corruptly procure any other person to com- Subornation mit the crime of perjury, as before defined, tire person so offending shall, upon °f Perjury; conviction thereof, suffer the same punishments and disabilities, as in case of same p?ni?hactual perjury. ment as perjury.} 13. That if any judge, or other person concerned in the administration Bribery in a of justia, or any person holding any office or appointment under the autbori- juilgc,&c.; fine, ty of this state, shall take or receive .any undue reward, to influence his beha- imprisonment, vior in his office or appointment, or if any person shall offer or tender a re- ai,<1 disability ward, with view to influence the behavior of any judge, or other person con- w hold office, cerned in the administration of justice, or any person holding any office or appointment as aforesaid, such person so offending shall, on conviction thereof, be fined in a sum not exceeding five thousand dollars, and imprisoned not exceeding twelve months, at the discretion of the court, and be perpetually disabled from giving testimony in any court, being a juror, or holding any office of honor or profit in this state.{ 14. That if any person shall forge, counterfeit or alter any bills of cred- Forgery; whipit,orders, certificates or securities, issued by the authority of this state, or of P’n6i nne) imthe United States, or of any of the United States, or any note, or obligation, prismum-nt and or any other writing of any other person or persons whatever, with an intent dla,bl11 t0 to defraud, or shall utter and put off any such forged, altered or counterfeit bill or bills, order or orders, certificate or certificates, security or securities, issued by authority as aforesaid, note or obligation, or other writing, knowing them to be such, or shall counsel or advise, procure or in anywise assist in the forging, altering or counterfeiting, or signing any bill, order, certificate, security, note, obligation or other writing, knowing them to be false, or shall engrave any plate, or make any instrument to be used for the purpose aforesaid, such person so offending shall, on conviction thereof, be whipped not exceeding thirty-nine stripes on his naked back, and be fined in double the sum he shall thereby have defrauded, or attempted to defraud onother, one half thereof to the party injured, or intended to be injured, and be imprisoned not exceeding two years, at the discretion of the court, and shall, moreover, forever after be rendered incapable of being a juror, or sustaining any office of trust. hold office, or serve as juror.Counterfeiting; j 15. That if any person shall stamp, or otherwise